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Nation Branding and the Creative City, Tokyo 
 
 
Introduction 
Cultural policy as practiced by nation-state governments, international non-government 
organizations such as UNESCO, or as an academic discipline, has a relatively recent 
history in the post-World War Two era.  Yet it has a long pre-history which can be traced 
back to the international expositions of the mid 19th century. International expositions 
provided displays of the latest industrial, military and communication technologies along 
with art, crafts, folk cultured exotica from Western nations and their colonies. Japan quickly 
saw the importance of using the international expositions not only to learn about western 
civilization, but also as an opportunity to display and legitimate a particular image of Japan 
to the rest of the world,1 especially as it had been long closed off from the West in the 
Tokugawa Era (1603-1868). More importantly, to avoid the threat of Western invasion and 
keep its independence, the new Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, 
decided that rather than attempting a military defence, a cleverer strategy could be to 
become seen as a civilized nation-state by the West that was worthy of equal treatment. 
This was because ‘the best defence against the Western nation-state was the construction 
of a modern, legal state of its own’ (Najita and Harootunian 1990:716). It must be noted that 
to follow the Western nation-state model also involved colonialism; hence Japan developed 
a policy of endorsing its civilizational credentials by showing its national power and colonial 
ambitions to the rest of East Asia.  
 
Prior to the emergence of the twentieth century mass media and the revolutions in 
communication technology, which are powerful devices to influence not only people’s view 
of everyday life, but also public opinion, one of the most effective political devices to bolster 
a nation’s image, in order to enhance its political influence, was international expositions. 
This is what we would now call public diplomacy.  Public diplomacy can be understood as a 
political strategy entailing cultural practices/activities which are framed by cultural 
diplomacy. While public diplomacy is always associated with a certain political objective, 
cultural diplomacy does not opt for mere political propaganda-driven campaigns, rather it 
fosters the intention of winning ‘hearts and minds’ and establishing mutual trust. It is 
implemented by establishing ‘a selected national image by exporting appealing cultural 
                                                   
1 In fact Japan was one of the first to present itself to the world with a national pavilion at 1867 Paris 
Exposition. This was followed by the participation of the new Japanese Meiji nation-state at the 1873 
Vienna International Exposition. 
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products’ (Iwabuchi 2015:419, emphasize added).  
 
These cultural products are usually categorized as ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004), a term which 
has frequently been used in the context of ‘Cool Japan’.2 In the Japanese context, soft 
power has often been equated with Japanese popular culture, such as manga, anime, video 
game and fashion.  Following Nye’s concept, it can be understood that the soft power 
works in creating ‘more receptive to Japan’s positions through the dissemination of the 
country’s cultures and values’ (Iwabuchi 2015: 419-420).  The growing consciousness of 
the significance of cultural power in the context of contemporary cultural diplomacy, and the 
potential of Cool Japan as a new cultural policy, can be seen as a strategy that developed 
since the year 2000, in order to draw attention from consumers around the world and make 
Japanese popular culture not only a globally successful popular culture for revitalizing the 
economy, but also as an effective vehicle for soft power and cultural diplomacy.  The idea 
of creating positive image of the nation so as to sustain or improve its privilege or 
advantageous position in the global national ranking can be seen as closely bound to that of 
nation branding.  Whereas conventional public diplomacy targeted the creation of amicable 
international relations between nation-states, the new cultural policy and nation branding via 
soft power, sought to appeal to both ordinary people who were their own national citizens, 
and people in other countries.   
 
Although nation branding aims to cultivate a better image of Japan among Japanese 
people, initiatives such as the Cool Japan one, are not necessarily the most successful 
ways to cultivate consciousness of national belonging and a positive image of Japan. 
Rather, a positive image of one’s own nation with nationalistic sentiments might be 
stimulated by global mega-events, such as the Olympics and International Expositions. 
Tokyo, the capital city of Japan, has been elected as the host city for the next Olympic and 
Paralympic 2020 Games. There has been considerable concern in Tokyo about how best to 
present and stage itself to promote a positive image of contemporary Japan; one which 
should be significantly different from that of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The image of Tokyo 
inevitably stands for the national image of Japan.  In this sense, Tokyo can serve as the 
most effective cultural diplomatic device.  The device could also work to cultivate Japanese 
people’s positive self-esteem, as well as to heighten other counties’ perceived image of 
                                                   
2 Soft power - The term, soft power was coined by Joseph Nye (1990) reflecting to the Cold War context, it 
was believed that ‘cultural diplomacy may well be a more appropriate weapon than warfare’ (Anholt 
2015:194). This development was further fuelled by the Bush Administration’s response to the September 
11 terrorist attack in 2001. It must note that Cool Japan was not only prompted by nation branding, but also 
by the spreading ‘soft power paradigm’ (see Fan, Y 2008). 
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Japan.  
 
The idea of city as ‘cultural powerhouse’ (Yeoh 2005:945) has been discussed in debates 
about creative cities (Kong 2014).  Although Tokyo has been widely acknowledged as a 
huge economic and political centre and mature consumer city, it has been far behind in 
becoming a world-class creative city.  To improve the current situation, a new cultural 
urban plan has been proposed since 2014.  Contrasting the dominant image of cultural 
richness in south central Tokyo (e.g. Aoyama, Roppoingi and Ginza), the proposal 
highlights the rich traditional cultural resources of north central Tokyo (e.g. Ueno, Hongo, 
Akihabara, Kanda, Jimpocho and Yushima).  Through an attempt to re-activate, 
re-discover and re-connect traditional cultural assets in these regions, the new cultural 
urban plan, ‘the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision’ proposes to create ‘a cultural unit’.  
This idea could be expanded to apply to all regions throughout Tokyo. Each cultural unit can 
be seen as composed of diversified local/regional cultural assets. Then eventually all 
cultural units of the various communities/locals/regions could transform Tokyo into a 
‘cultural museum’ (Yoshimi 2016).  
 
This paper attempts to briefly outline how Japanese cultural policy has developed in its 
political and economic environments from the early 20th century to the present.  This can 
illuminate the complex relationship between the political objectives of public diplomacy and 
various practices of cultural policy. Focusing on contemporary cultural policy in Japan, the 
paper also examines the Cool Japan initiative and the ways in which it has been expected to 
be a vital cultural device for creating a new image of Japan as a pioneer of soft power, and a 
political device for improving Japan’s self-esteem and reputation for other countries. In this 
light, the Cool Japan initiative can also be closely related to the principle of nation branding. 
 
Since Japan has been elected as the host city of the next 2020 Olympics, the paper also 
locates the effort of nation branding within the context of creative city policy in Japan, 
drawing on an on-going city project, the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision. The paper 
argues that this can be seen as a new type of urban reform to challenge conventional 
mega-scale city planning and creative city policy. By proposing the re-connection of cultural 
assets to enhance cultural value, and connectivity of people to pick up as many voices as 
possible, the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision emphases the importance of creating 
networking not only as top-down cultural resources used at the regional level, but also 
among cultural specialists, local communities, NGO, the government institutions and various 
civic groups. In this light, the paper asserts that the Cultural Resources District Vision can 
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be viewed as a good speculative case to suggest that crucial elements of the lived cultural 
policy can be brought together to work as a practice of re-vitalization of cultural values and a 
consensus-making process to enhance mutual understanding, collaboration and active 
participation.   
 
 
The Backgrounds of Japanese Cultural Policy 
The concern with the promotion of cultural value, its positive reception by both domestic and 
foreign audiences, and enhanced national image have become pivotal components for 
contemporary cultural policy. Although today’s Japanese cultural policy is highly 
institutionalized, the field of cultural policy was neither systematic nor regulated until the late 
1980s (Kawashima 2012: 296). The early steps forward the development of Japanese 
cultural policy can be traced back to Japan’s greater involvement in the emerging 
international community of nations which gained momentum after World War One. 
 
Important impetus was proceeded by the needs of many countries to observe U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson’s diplomatic communications about the need to stabilize the 
international order after World War One which eventually led to the formation of the League 
of Nations, the interwar forerunner to the United Nations. A key experience of the Japanese 
has the eloquent Chinese delegation against Japanese expansionism in China at the Paris 
Peace Conference followed by systematic anti-Japanese sentiment on the part of Chinese 
intellectuals. This prompted a Japanese reaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affair (MOFA) 
establishing the Department of Information in April 1920 and a new policy of cultural 
exchange with China. 
 
In 1934, the Society for International Cultural Relations was established (incidentally, the 
British Council was also established the same year). This was the time ‘Japan become the 
first and only non-Western nation to establish a modern international cultural exchange 
organization’ (Ozawa 2009:273). Such imitations had to be suspended following the 
invasion of Manchuria and China War after 1931, following by the Second World War in 
1939. 
 
After World War II, Japan as a defeated country was under the unconditional occupation of 
the Allied Forces and effectively under the control of the United States. Japan was required 
to abandon its state-controlled cultural policies and needed to transform itself from its 
self-image as a militaristic, semi-feudalistic and authoritarian state to a peaceful democratic 
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and liberal state by creating a new vision guided by cultural related policy. Hence ’Prime 
Minister Tetsu Katayama, in an important speech, advocated the “construction of a culture 
state” in order to restore national pride and international credibility’ (Ozawa 2009: 274). The 
Korean War (1950-53) proved to be a key event in the reconstitution of the Japanese 
economy and gradual rehabilitation and reintroduction into international affairs. 
 
In 1964 the Tokyo Olympics followed by the 1970 Osaka Expo, were global mega events 
that helped Japan to deliver evidence of its fully recovery from the devastation of the war, as 
well as demonstrating its potential to becoming a world-class economic power with 
advanced science and technology. Yet there was still considerable ambivalence. On the 
one hand, Japanese economic success drew attention from the West with books like 
Vogel’s Japan as Number One (1979), showing how the United States could benefit from 
the lessons of Japan, such as meritocratic practices, corporate organisations, basic 
education, welfare and so on (see Sugimoto 2014: 201). On the other hand, Japanese 
businessmen were still negatively called ‘economic animals’, and seem as seriously over- 
dedicated, over-loyal and dutiful to their own companies. One of the consequences was the 
establishment of the Agency for Cultural Affairs in 1968. Reflecting the anti-Japanese 
sentiments and increasing attention to economic success and ‘suffering from Japan-U.S. 
frictions over trade imbalances and the Nixon Shocks3, the Japanese diplomatic community 
began to recognize combating misunderstandings about Japanese culture and behaviour as 
an urgent diplomatic agenda’ (Ozawa 2009: 275).     
  
The Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda also took an initiative to create the establishment of an 
international cultural exchange organization which initially focused on relations with the 
United States. This plan led to the seting up the Japan Foundation, which operated under 
the supervision of the cultural division of MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan) in 
October 1972. The foundation dealt with the exchange of leading academic and cultural 
personal, the promotion of Japanese studies overseas and Japanese language education, 
and the organization of workshops and seminars to introduce Japanese culture and so on. 
The objective of the foundation today is the promotion of international cultural exchange 
through a comprehensive range of programmes in all regions of the world.  The 
foundation’s global network consists of its Tokyo headquarters, the Kyoto Office, two 
                                                   
3 U.S president Richard Nixon stopped the direct convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold in 1971 (‘dollar 
shock’) and cancelled the Bretton Woods system in 1973. Nixon also terminated the U.S. confrontational 
policy toward China without consultation with Japan, in 1972. ‘These shocking experiences reminded the 
Japanese leaders of their catastrophic isolation in the 1930s and 1940s’ (Ozawa 2009:274). 
 
6 
Japanese-language institutes and 24 overseas offices in 23 countries (The Japan 
Foundation official home page). The foundation become as an independent administrative 
institution in October 2003. 
 
Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita spoke of his ‘international cooperation initiative’ in London 
in May 1988. The plan was consisted of three major themes: cooperation for peace, 
enhancement of ODA (official development assistance) and strengthening international 
cultural exchange. At this point, cultural exchanges became the first priority issue in 
Japanese diplomatic strategies. After his speech, the Advisory Group on International 
Cultural Exchange was set up. The period between in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was 
one in which Japanese global economic power became more salient. This economic 
success drew much criticism in the United States, regarding the huge trade imbalances, and 
relatively closed market conditions in Japan. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the sense of 
irritation and fear of the United States towards Japan helped ‘Japan bashing’ to grow. 
Reflecting on this condition in 1991, the advisory group emphasized Japan’s greater 
contributions to the international community and established the Japan Foundation Centre 
for Global Partnership (日米センター literally mean in Japanese, the Centre for Japan and 
U.S Partnership). The mission of the centre was ‘to promote collaboration between Japan 
and the United States with the goal of fulfilling shared global responsibilities and contributing 
to improvement in the world’s welfare and to enhance dialogue and interchange between 
Japanese and U.S. citizens on a wide range of issues, thereby improving bilateral relations’ 
(Ozawa 2009: 277). 
 
The 1990s was also the time when other East Asian countries began to become 
acknowledged as global economic powers, which started to generate a sense of 
regionalism and created a new identity “We Asians” (Ozawa 2009: 277). Under the 
changing Asian communities, the second report of the Conference for the Promotion of 
International Cultural Exchange in 1994 started to underscore the importance of fostering a 
sense of the Asian communities’ spirit for the future. This was the time, the new cultural 
diplomatic strategies made an important shift from the conventional idea of introducing 
Japanese traditional culture and value, to the new direction of responding to the need of 
Asian identity formation.   
 
Yet in the 2000s, the actual diplomatic situation between Japan and the rest of East Asia, 
especially Korea and China had begun to increasingly deteriorate with events such as the 
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controversies surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine4 and subsequent controversy about the 
Japanese school history textbook problem flared up5.  
 
In response to the criticism, the Council for the Promotion of Cultural Diplomacy was 
launched by Prime Minister Koizumi in December 2004. The council suggested that it was 
important to promote a better understanding of Japan and improvement of Japan’s image 
(toward both those inside and outside Japan), and that the ‘(better) understanding of Japan 
by the public of foreign countries may be the most influential factor for the government of 
that country in deciding policies and actions towards Japan’ (Ozawa 2009: 278). This 
improvement of the nation’s image through appealing to the wider public (people) both 
inside and outside the nation can be understood as a new initiative of cultural diplomacy in 
which is the now so-called ‘nation branding’ became a central strategy for cultural policy. 
 
 
Cool Japan and Nation Branding 
The Japanese government has been promoting nation brand with the slogan ‘Cool Japan’ 
since the beginning of the present century. This new initiative sought to capitalize upon 
Japanese popular culture such as manga, anime, video game and fashion, which have 
drawn attention consumers around the world and has become one of the globally successful 
popular cultures. The aim of ‘Cool Japan’ is not only to expand creative industry market to 
the global level, but also to replace the dominant ‘uncool’ images of Japan as a highly 
regulated society with rigid hierarchal working practices. This was influenced by the 
American journalist Douglas McGray’s report (2002), in which he coined the term ‘Gross 
National Cool’ to expressed the increasing popularity of Japanese popular culture as the 
Cool Japan phenomenon.6 Such international endorsement of valid Japanese cultural 
presence created the hope and expectation that Japan could recover from the prolonged 
                                                   
4 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the shrine for praying for those who died in the service of Japan. 
Among the 2.4 million souls of dead soldiers enshrines, some of those included were, however, World War 
II war criminals. The visit of the prime minister was seen as violating the principle of a pacific nation and 
provoked memories of Japan’s military/fascism past. This is the reason the prime minister was strongly 
criticized by China and South Korea.) 
5 The problem was the recognition of the historical past by the Japanese government. There are strong 
discrepancies in the war history between Japan and other countries, which Japan occupied during wartime, 
such as China and Korea. This has led to a long debate since the 1950s, yet it became more serious at the 
time of Prime minister Koizumi government. 
 
6 It should be noted that Japan has proved to be attractive to the West with the forms of Japonism 
appearing in the Western imagination several times in the past. In the 19th century, the French 
Impressionists were influenced by Japanese art, and Japanese pottery and ornaments also become 
popular consumer goods in the U.K. In the 1980s global success of Japanese business organizational 
systems and marketing strategies also drew much attention from the world.  ‘Tentatively, it appears that 
“Japan” has been either admired or feared and hated in “the West”’ (Valaskivi 2013, 501; see Sugimoto 
2014, Napier 2007 and Sugiura 2008). 
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economic stagnation since the late 1990s, which was often called ‘the lost decade’.  
Interestingly, the high esteem for Japanese popular culture was not only the result of 
diplomatic efforts on the part of the Japanese government. Here a number of factors can be 
identified: the culture-related industries sought overseas markets because of the stagnating 
domestic economy; the Internet and other information technologies helped create a greater 
receptivity for other cultures, including Japan; there were visibly more economic, 
educational and cultural exchanges in what became termed the ‘Asian Union’ (Gresser 
2004 cited in Sugiura 2008:137).    
 
It is often suggested that the idea of Cool Japan came from ‘Cool Britannia’, which was 
associated with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour’s political campaign in the 1990s. 
The aim of the campaign was to promote national pride, enhance cultural industries and 
improve the national reputation and image, through supporting and embracing British 
popular culture. Even though the campaign had a mixed reception with positive and 
negative reviews, ‘the Cool Britannia campaign was studied closely by the Japanese actors 
involved in nation branding’ (Valaskivi 2013:492). With a need for greater competitiveness 
to response to more intense market pressure in ‘the age of the global economy’, nation 
branding became seen as a powerful strategy to enhance the nation’s global economic 
power through appealing to its innovative, creative, aesthetic, and authentic characteristics. 
Hence, nation branding became an important issue. 
 
Yet, nation branding has been always already exercised in the context of public diplomacy, 
since the very aim of public diplomacy is to improve national image in order to create or to 
sustain privileged or advantageous nation’s status in the global ranking. But this was 
generally mobilized by the governmental apparatus delivering diplomatic messages, and 
was largely conducted at the inter-state relations level in order to maintain smooth 
international relationships.  But as mentioned earlier, contemporary nation branding seeks 
to create a positive national identity both for its own national citizens, and those in other 
countries (see Fan 2010). Furthermore, given the situation of the expanding networks and 
links between civil societies; the growing influence of non-governmental actors/agents; and 
the increasing visibility of diverse individuals through social media, nation branding as a 
components of cultural diplomacy has gained more weight. In the new phase of global 
network communication, Cool Japan, then, became a more significant strategy of nation 
branding.  
 
In the speech of the Foreign Minister Aso (who become the Prime Minister in 2008 to 2009) 
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in 2006, he expressed his views about the attractiveness of the image of Cool Japan, and its 
role as a key element in Japanese cultural diplomacy (see Iwabuchi 2015:424). He also 
emphasized the effectiveness of popular culture and its capacity to increasing influence 
ordinary people.7 
 
   What we have now is an era in which diplomacy at the national level is affected 
dramatically by the climate of opinion arising from the average person. And that is exactly 
why we want pop culture, which is so effective in penetrating throughout the general 
public, to be our ally in diplomacy. To put this another way, one part of diplomacy lies in 
having a competitive brand image, so to speak. Now more than ever, it is impossible for 
this to stay entirely within the realm of the work of diplomats. It is necessary for us to 
draw on assistance from a broad spectrum of people who are involved in Japanese 
culture. (Aso, 2006 at Digital Hollywood University "A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy: A 
Call to Japan's Cultural Practitioners") 
 
In the wake of the rising competitiveness of Japanese popular culture, the Japanese 
government made sustained efforts to bring it into the sphere of cultural diplomacy. It 
became firmly institutionalized under Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006). He 
actively planned to improve Japan’s attractive image and soft power by encouraging the 
development of the cultural industries. This initiative led to establish various committees and 
councils since at the beginning of the 2000s, such as the Division of Culture and Information 
Related Industries (2001), the Headquarters for Intellectual Property Strategy (2003), the 
Japan National Tourism Organisation (2003), and the Research Committee for Content 
Business (2005) (see Iwabuchi 2015: 423). Although the Cool Japan policy has been taking 
placed in different ways through the strategies of a numbers of relevant ministries, offices, 
local governments, and other organizations, following the Proposal by the Cool Japan 
Advisory Council in May 2011, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) took 
charge of directing the ‘Cool Japan/Creative Industries Policy’ initiative (METI official 
webpage). 8  The goal of the policy is to ‘promote overseas advancement of an 
internationally appreciated "Cool Japan" brand, cultivation of creative industries, promotion 
of these industries in Japan and abroad, and other related initiatives from cross-industry and 
                                                   
7 See Hirai (2015) and Huang (2011) for a detailed account of the reception of Japanese popular culture in 
East Asia. 
 
8 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/mono_info_service/creative_industries/creative_industries.html 
(accessed 20 Sep 2016). 
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cross-government standpoints’ (METI office web page).9 
 
The Cabinet Secretariat has also started the ‘Cool Japan Promotion Council’ in 2013. In his 
speech in the first meeting of the "Cool Japan" Promotion Council at the Prime Minister's 
Office, the Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, he stated that 50 billion yen will be submitted to the 
Diet for promoting ‘Cool Japan’.  
 
He remarked  
 
   It [Cool Japan] is one of the important policy issues for the Abe Cabinet to break through 
the stagnation that hangs over Japan and to develop the country further from now on, 
have the Japanese people feel confident of the greatness of Japan including its tradition 
and culture, and make all people realize that things from Japan are great, which will also 
lead to the burgeoning of a sense of respect for Japan (Abe, 2013, emphasizes added – 
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet official home page).10  
 
 
Cool Japan’s Internal and External Projection  
Abe’s political intention in the speech is clear: Cool Japan was understood not only as 
nation branding to boost Japan to a higher position in the Nations Brands Index, but also to 
act as a domestic political device to reinforce the sense of positive self-esteem for Japanese 
citizens. Drawing on Simon Anholt's theory of branding in the context of marketing, (2007:6), 
Valaskivi correctly points out that establishing a strong internal culture sharing the same 
values and ‘the spirit of the organization’ is a crucial factor for building a powerful reputation. 
The better nation brand needs the better perception of itself.  Since ‘branding is 
nevertheless first and foremost directed inward, towards the nation itself, aimed at creating 
a stronger, more coherent sense of the national “self” and building self-esteem’ (Valaskivi: 
490). The Cool Japan initiative with its various governmental activities could help to fashion 
a new narrative the nation and to reinforce of a sense of national belonging. Such 
self-internalization of the nation’s brand image could be constructed by the process of 
re-discovering Japan and re-valuing cultural heritage and tradition, and re-articulating the 
‘taken-for-granted’ social and cultural values and meanings, at the same time as 
recognizing ‘new’ Japan by using carefully chosen symbols of politically invented new 
                                                   
9 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/mono_info_service/creative_industries/creative_industries.html 
(Accessed 20 Sep 2016). 
10 http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/actions/201303/04cooljpn_e.html (accessed 20 Sep 2016). 
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narratives and meanings. 
 
However, how far the Cool Japan as nation branding actually affected to Japanese citizen’s 
perception of Japan and actually nurtured national pride, remains an open question. 
According to the report of the public opinion survey on social awareness conducted by the 
Government Public Relations Office in the Cabinet Office in 2016, o answer the question of 
what thing is the most you can be proud of in Japan and the Japanese people, the highest 
percentage were those who thought that Japan is ‘good public safety (a high security 
society)’ (56.6%). The second highest percentage group was those who were proud of 
‘beautiful nature’ (55.4%) and the third highest group was those who were proud of 
‘excellent culture and arts’ (49.9%).  The ‘excellent culture and arts’ group has never been 
the leading category for more than 23 years. (Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on 
Social Awareness, 2016:13)11 
 
The supplemental public opinion survey which was conducted in 2009 also further detailed 
people’s opinions about Japanese culture. To answer the question of what is the most you 
can be proud of in ‘Japanese culture and the arts’ towards the rest of the world, the highest 
percentage of the group was those who were proud of traditional art (64.7%), the second 
highest was a group who were proud of historical architecture and spots/remains/ruins 
(56.4%) and the third highest was those who a proud of Japanese food culture (31.5%).12 
What these statistics illuminate is that Japanese citizens think that both culture in general 
and contemporary popular culture, involved in Cool Japan in particular, are not necessarily 
the things one can be the most proud of. This is to say, that the Cool Japan initiative along 
with the other new narratives and images of Japan driven by political imperatives, fail to 
reinforce Japanese identity.  
 
There is a belief in ‘culture’ as a means to help nurturing Japanese pride though embracing 
Japanese traditional and contemporary culture. However, it seems that ‘culture’ can only 
work to create ‘imaginary Cool Japan’ or works as the rhetorical power to create an 
imaginary Japan. Since, Noriko Aso claims that ‘[I]n Japan, when the going gets tough - too 
                                                   
11 http://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/pdf/summarys15.pdf (Accessed 24 Sep 2016). 
The survey was conducted in the period 28 January - 14 February 2016. It covered more than 10,000 
individuals (comprised of adults over 20-year-old) from all over Japan and the response rate was 58.8% 
(5,877 individuals). Multiple answers were allowed. 
12 http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h21/h21-bunka/2-5.html (Accessed 24 Sep 2016). The survey was 
conducted by the by the Government Public Relations Office in the Cabinet Office in the period 5-15 
November 2009. It covered more than 3,000 individuals (comprised of adults over 20-year-old) from all over 
Japan and the response rate was 61.8% (1,853 individuals). Multiple answers were allowed. 
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much international scrutiny, failure to achieve domestic political goals, loss of confidence in 
political economic institutions - a common response is to bring up “culture”’ (McVeigh 2004: 
198; see also Aso 2002 cited in Dalio-Bul 2009: 260-261). Dalio-Bul concludes that ‘culture’ 
(bunka) is thus often positioned at the rhetorical core of national renovation projects’ in the 
context of Japanese politics. Daliot-Bul also elaborates on the national renovation project, 
Cool Japan. No matter how ‘culture’ can help to reinforce a sense of national identity, the 
Cool Japan initiative can be seen as a political attempt of re-discovering ‘Japan’s national 
cultural power, and a reflection of the requisites of disseminating influential message for 
creating national identity which formed “national pride”’ (see Dalio-Bul 2009: 259).   
 
In the Intellectual Property Strategic Programs in 2005,  
 
[t]he authors encourage the Japanese people to sufficiently ‘utilize [their] outstanding 
capabilities in inventing and creating’ (Nihonjin no mottmo sugureta sozoryoku 
sosakuryoku) and on contributing to the development of the world’s futures and 
civilizations with the inventions and creations of Japanese people, aspiring for Japan to 
‘uphold an honoured position in the world’. (Intellectual Property Strategic Program 
2005: 2 cited in Daliot-bul 2009: 260 emphasis added)’  
 
This suggests that there are ‘recurrent self-congratulatory and ethnocentric assertions 
embedded in it’ (Daliot-bul, 2009: 260). Daliot-bul concludes that ‘the Japan Brand Strategy 
is thus also seen as a means to revitalize patriotic pride and recruit those patriotic feelings 
for national ends’. Hence, it can be viewed as a rhetorical imaginary of Japan in the 
domestic political context. 
 
So far there is, however, no clear evidence indicating that the Japan Brand Strategy, in 
other words, Japan’s nation branding equipped with the Cool Japan initiative, has helped to 
revitalize patriotic pride or a sense of love for the country. The question of Japanese identity 
for ordinary Japanese people, then, cannot always be seen an imminent issue in everyday 
contexts, since such consciousness often arises in the context of non-ordinariness, 
including the case of encountering situations which makes Japanese people feel alienated 
or disorientated through the unfamiliar (e.g. going abroad or being in a non-Japanese 
community). Evoking such feelings can always be seen as dependent on particular 
contexts. Amongst those that centrally emphasize national identity and belonging are global 
mega events, such as the Olympic Games or International Expositions. There are situations 
that place nations in ‘the same time and place’ as they are invited to compare and compete 
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with each other. Joining in such politicized games, means that nations are required to win in 
the sporting game, as well as in the political and economic game among nations. 
 
Here, it is worth noting that there is an interesting public opinion survey on patriotic 
sentiment/spirits conducted by the Cabinet Office Minister’s Secretariat Government Public 
Relations Office. This annual survey shows that Japanese people’s social awareness, 
includes a question about the feeling of love for one’s country, by asking people to respond 
in terms of whether their feelings are: ‘strong/do not know/weak’. In the period of more than 
three and half decade when the surveys were conducted, the highest percentage (58%) is 
for the group of those who answered that they have much stronger/relatively stronger 
feeling of love for the nation than other people; this occurred February 2013.(Overview of 
the Public Opinion Survey on Social Awareness, 2016:1).13  
 
This was at the time, 7th September 2013, when Tokyo was elected as the host city for the 
2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games.  The campaign to host the Tokyo Olympics and 
Paralympics had started a few years before the survey. Many committees and organizations 
had been established, such as the committee to campaign to host the Olympics in 2011 and 
it has been now taken over by the Tokyo Organizing Committee of the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games since 2014. The Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) organized a 
series of campaign activities, such as a parade of the 71 London Olympic medallists at 
Tokyo Ginza street in August 2012 which attracted a crowd of more than 500,000 people. 
(Japanese Olympic Committee official webpage).14 These campaigns did not just aim to 
appeal to IOC, but also to create excitement amongst Japanese people. They also help to 
develop an atmosphere conducive to supporting the national project and generate patriotic 
pride.   
 
 
City as a Cultural Imaginary Device 
Accordingly, Tokyo as the Olympic city, has become an important platform for Japan to 
create a new image of Japan. Today the city can be seen as a main cultural powerhouse 
often discussed in the context of growing Asian cities in the age of globalization (see Yeoh, 
1999; 2005) and seen as of the most important component of cultural policy (Lim 2012: 
261). Cities then, should not be seen as just a vital place for the concentration of financial 
and political power, but also vibrant spaces for the display of cultural capital and emblematic 
                                                   
13 http://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/pdf/summarys15.pdf (Accessed 24 Sep 2016). 
14 https://tokyo2020.jp/en/news/bid/20120820-01.html (Accessed 24 Sep 2016). 
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spaces for national image - nation branding. The idea of city as a ‘cultural powerhouse’ 
(Yeoh 2005: 945) engendered “‘Asian mega projects’ such as Tokyo’s Teleport Town 
(Toukyo rinkai fukutoshin keikaku) and Yokohama Minato Mirai 21 Project’ (Yeoh 
2005:947). Both can be seen as creative city projects which were part of ‘a new strategic 
urban planning method to reinvent the city as a vibrant hub of creative industries with the 
potential to improve the “quality of life” for citizens’ (Landry 2008 cited in Kim 2015:1) and to 
enhance the national image.  
 
According to the report of Policy of Cultural Affairs in Japan, Fiscal 2015 the Creative City 
Network of Japan was established in January 2013 so as to improve and enhance the 
network of creative cities all over Japan. ‘The Agency of Cultural Affairs supports this 
network in order to promote the Cultural and Artistic Creative City throughout Japan’ 
(Agency for Cultural Affair, The Policy of Cultural Affairs in Japan, Fiscal 2015: 33)15. The 
purpose is ‘to be a foundation to construct a peaceful and symbiotic Asian creative city 
network as well as to contribute to the reconstruction and regeneration of Japanese society 
by spreading and developing creative cities in our country’ (Creative City Network Japan 
English homepage emphasizes added).16 
 
Similar statements, targeting ’the development of a cultural and artistic creative city’ 
throughout Japanese cities in order to create network with Asian cities, can be also found in 
‘the Creative Tokyo Proposal’ announced by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’ in 
2012. The proposal manifests a vital role of the capital city, Tokyo. The proposal has a 
subtitle saying ‘Moving towards Creative Tokyo - Transforming Tokyo into a Creative 
Hub‘ which assures that Japan today should build a new society through the combined 
power of its industries, economy and culture, and that Tokyo become ‘the most prominent 
creative hub in Asia’ by fostering the development and diversity of Japan’s creative 
industries (The Creative Tokyo Proposal homepage ).17  
 
One of the major tasks is, 
 
                                                   
15  http://www.bunka.go.jp/english/about_us/policy_of_cultural_affairs/pdf/2015_policy.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). The Agency of Cultural Affairs also established ‘the Office for Promotion of the Creative City, 
the Agency for Cultural Affairs in April 2014, which provides advice to local government in order to promote 
the creation of the Cultural and Artistic Creative City’ (Agency for Cultural Affair, The Policy of Cultural 
Affairs in Japan, Fiscal 2015: 33). 
16 http://ccn-j.net/english/ (Accessed 20 Sep 2016).  
 
17 http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/mono_info_service/mono/creative/creative_tokyo/about/sengen_en.html 
(Accessed 20 Sep 2016). 
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With the support of Tokyo districts, Japanese creativity will be conveyed across both 
internationally and domestically. Through this, we will seek to bring in talented human 
resources, relevant information and funds from all around the world. We will also aim 
to establish Tokyo as a leading creative hub (The Creative Tokyo Proposal, emphasis 
added).18 
 
In this light, Tokyo is the main platform to expand Japanese creativity both externally and 
internally and is expected to be become the leading creative city in Asia. This can be seen 
as a reflection of Japan’s concerns about losing its prominent position and its presence in 
Asia, since the rapidly growing Chinese economy and expanding Korean cultural industries, 
generated fears of being overtaken and threaten Japan’s pride in Cool Japan.  Such 
concerns for revitalization of Tokyo’s brand competitiveness had already been expressed in 
the Creating a New Japan Proposal (Atarashii nihon no kozo) produced by Cool Japan 
Advisory Council in May 2011.  More precisely, the council proposed that one way to 
enhance the creative industries and the content industry, was to collaborated with the tourist 
campaign in order to increase Japan’s presence and attractiveness. It also suggested that 
making links between the Aoyama, Roppongi, Ginza and Sumida regions (where ‘the 
Skytree' was built) would help to create a diversified Tokyo brand (‘Creating New Japan’ 
2011:10).  Except for the Sumida region, Tokyo’s northwest city districts, Aoyama, 
Roppongi and Ginza have been internationally well acknowledged as ‘innovative’, ’creative’, 
‘fashionable’, ‘trendy’ and ‘sophisticated urbane modern’ city areas. 
 
 
Cultural Resources in the Central Tokyo North (CTN) 
To challenge the current dominant image of cultural richness of south-central Tokyo, 
(Aoyama, Roppoingi, Ginza et al), the new urban cultural plan (proposed in 2014 and 
currently being implemented), has re-discovered the rich cultural resources of north-central 
and eastern Tokyo (Ueno, Hongo, Akihabara, Kanda, Jimpocho and Yushima).  The 
districts have been characterized as follow, 
 
’This area is composed of Ueno, home of Japan’s largest concentration of history and 
art museums, as well as the Tokyo University of the Arts; Hongo, a centre of 
academic learning home to the University of Tokyo; Yanesen, a popular spot among 
foreign tourists filled with old shops, alleys, row houses, and temples; Yushima, a 
                                                   
18 http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/mono_info_service/mono/creative/creative_tokyo/about/sengen_en.html, 
(Accessed 20 Sep 2016). 
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neighbourhood of religious and culinary culture entered on the axis stretching from 
Yushima Seido, a Confucian Temple, and Kanda Shrine to Yushima Tenjin Shrine; 
Jimbocho, the birthplace of modern learning in Japan once familiar to Sun Yat-sen, Lu 
xun, Zhou Enlai, and other young leaders of Aisa, and Today a district of private 
universities, publishers, and bookstores; and Akihabara, known today across the 
world not only as an electronics town, but also as a mecca of manga, anime and 
game culture’ (the Report of the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision 2016 :2).19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
19 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf 
(Accessed 20 Sep 2016). 
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Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision 
(Source: Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision Homepage) 
 
This project has been driven by the Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance, which was founded 
as a result of preliminary discussions by the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision in 
June 2014.20 The participants consist of ‘practitioners and specialists belonging to the 
                                                   
20 Note: ‘The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance and the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Promotion 
Committee (tentative name), a public-private-academic-industry organization envisioned to be established 
in 2018, will take the lead in realizing the Tokyo Cultural Resources District vision’ (the Report of the Tokyo 
18 
cabinet, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Cultural Agency, universities, 
private research organizations and companies’ (Tokyo Cultural resources District Vision 
Homepage: 3).21 
 
The Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision emphasizes the importance of Tokyo’s 
historical tradition of cultural and intellectual creativity in order to increase competitiveness 
in the global nation brand market and enhance Japan’s presence in the world. They 
postulate that although Tokyo has enormous potential to develop its rich cultural resources, 
it has remained far behind in its efforts to become a world-class creative city.  Since the 
Edo period (1603~1868), the north-central and eastern areas of Tokyo, which were the main 
commoner neighbourhoods, did not become subjected to large-scale redevelopment and so 
survived relatively intact the past half century of prioritization of motorway construction and 
high-rise buildings. This city planning phase is epitomized by the 1964 Olympic Games 
Metropolitan Expressway, Aoyama Boulevard and Olympic facilities, such as Yoyogi 
National Gymnasium and Komazawa Olympic Park Stadium. After that, many high-rise 
buildings in West Shinjuku were increasingly constructed in the 1970s. Since the 1980s, 
Roppongi, Ebisu, Shingagwa and Shiodome in south-central Tokyo have become the main 
areas to create a fashionable cultural centre relying on large scale city planning (see Tokyo 
Cultural Resources District Vision Report 2016: 1).22 
 
 
The Central Tokyo North’s Cultural Resources and an Idea of ‘Tradition’ 
The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance declared that the 2020 Tokyo Olympics should not 
repeat the same scale of city planning as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The Alliance 
emphasizes that large-scale redevelopments and the ‘scrap and rebuild’ format are dated 
principles. The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance also argues that Tokyo’s distinctiveness 
is not because of its huge population, economic power, political centre or advanced 
technology and mature consumer culture.  The Alliance explains that looking back to the 
17th century, Edo, as Tokyo was known until 1868, was already the world’s largest city and 
the place that prompted Japanese modernization. In fact Edo was a multicultural metropolis 
which was created by the Sankin Kotai system (the feudal lords with his retainers were 
                                                                                                                                                     
Cultural Resources District Vision 2016: 23). see 
http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 20 
Sep 2016) . 
21 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016).  
22 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). 
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required to spend every other year in residence in Edo. The system created chances to 
bring many local cultures from all over Japan to Edo and took back Edo culture to their 
regions). Accordingly, Edo was a cultural powerhouse, which developed with a flourishing 
cosmopolitan culture among commoners, such as Kabuki theatre, ukiyo-e prints, haiku 
poetry and Dutch learning. Following the Meiji Period (1868-1912), many other cultural 
fields, such as architecture, literature, painting, and film were also largely cultivated in 
Tokyo. Hence, The Alliance concludes that Tokyo has always already been a city 
encompassing a huge cultural heritage with clear world competitive value (see Tokyo 
Cultural Resources District Vision Report: 1-2).23 
 
It is worth noting that a good deal of the traditional cultural assets cultivated over the last 
several centuries in Tokyo, as explained earlier, are still to be found in the Central Tokyo 
North (CTN) district, the areas which The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance wants to 
revitalize. This focuses on the discourse of Japanese tradition as an unchangeable 
authentic cultural asset, has also been used in expressing the Tokyo Cultural Resources 
District Vision’s of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic.  In its report, The Tokyo Cultural Resources 
Alliance claims that ‘with 2020 Tokyo Olympic in mind, Tokyo should improve its 
attractiveness by promoting the uncontested value of Central North Tokyo, which has long 
been cultivated through Edo and Meiji’s culture and life (Tokyo Cultural Resources District 
Vision Report 2016: 4). The discourse of Japanese tradition portrays a ‘ahistorical Japanese 
national character that is radically different from anything else and is expressed in a 
diversified range of symbolic forms, old and new’ (see Moeran 1996 TCS cited in Daliot-Bul 
2009:253). This is why Japanese tradition has often been used and re-used as an effective 
means to create an ahistorical image of Japan.  
 
One of the core members of The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance, a professor of 
University of Tokyo, Shunya Yoshimi, advocates that Japan as the 2020 Olympic host 
country should pursue new values and social perspectives which should be different from 
those of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.  Rather than executing a large-scale city infrastructure 
and prioritizing motor car culture (which were central to the plans for the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympics), Japan today should pay more attention to revitalizing and recreating something 
which has been damaged, destroyed, and ‘disconnected’ at the expense of urbanizing 
process in Tokyo. Cultural assets in the Central Tokyo North districts are mostly survivors, 
irreplaceable cultural resources created in the past - Japanese tradition. Hence, Yoshimi’s 
                                                   
23 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). 
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proposal further emphasizes the importance of the revitalization and sustainability of 
‘tradition’ as the main vision of the Alliance.  
 
 
Tokyo as a Cultural Device for Nation Brand 
Recently, Central Tokyo North has been also acknowledged as an ideal place to realize the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s Tokyo Vision for Arts and Culture. It outlines the idea of 
‘Tokyo as a city of individuality and diversity, born of the coexistence and fusion of traditional 
and modern culture’ (Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision Report 2016: 2).24 Both 
Japanese traditional culture and contemporary popular culture lie in the Central Tokyo North 
area. The Alliance believed that this principle is congruent with a fundamental idea of the 
creative cities movement that cities ‘must be rooted in cultural tradition, creative talent and 
tolerance of diversity’ (Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision Report 2016: 2).25 In line 
with this definition, the Alliance asserts that 21st century leading cities will be those cities, 
which respect cultural tradition with open-mindedness to diversity. These cities can also 
attract gifted creative people from around the world.  
 
Therefore, there is the need to reassess and revitalize the cultural resources a city has 
accumulated over its history. The Alliance emphasized the significance of ‘restoring the 
unity of the Tokyo Cultural Resources District in Central Tokyo North in order to renovate 
the region as an epicentre for culture, arts, and science’, s district which ‘connects’ Ueno 
(arts culture), Yanasen (community culture), Hongo (intellectual culture), Yeshiva (religious 
and spiritual culture), Jimpocho (publishing culture) and Akihabara (popular culture). This 
can ‘produce the space where people enjoy walking, dwelling and living. This will be a vital 
strategy to create Tokyo’s ‘legacy’ in the world’ (Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision 
Report 2016: 4). This view can also resonate with the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC)’s principle for the Olympic Games in the 21st century - ‘sustainable legacies’. Hence, 
The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance concludes that ‘(all these processes) will promote 
not only the 2020 Olympic city, Tokyo’s cultural presence, but rather Japan’s cultural 
presence in the world’ (Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision Report 2016:3).26  
 
Here, we can see Tokyo has been cast as a nation-branding device. There are a plethora of 
                                                   
24 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). 
25 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). 
26 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). 
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attractive spots which can be ‘connected’ to each other in various ways to create Tokyo 
Central North as a cultural unit. An artist, art producer, and professor of Tokyo University of 
the Arts, Katsuhiko Hibino observes that ‘Tokyo is constituted of various different 
regionalities/localities.’  (Asahi Newspaper, evening paper, 6 January: 4). This suggests 
that each communities and regions in Tokyo could possibly become ‘a cultural unit’. This is 
what Yoshimi calls ‘community as a cultural museum’. This means that each region contains 
various cultural entities, which can be represented as unknown/forgotten narratives, which 
should be revitalized by rediscovering traditional cultural connectivities and networks 
existed in the past. This idea can also be further stretched to the whole of Tokyo. 
Accordingly, the attractive ‘cultural units’ throughout Tokyo can be connected to each other 
to create a wider cultural constellation. Eventually Tokyo as a creative city and a device of 
national branding, could become an influential world class cultural centre, Tokyo as a 
cultural museum, which is therefore able to represent and enhance the distinctiveness of 
Japan’s cultural presence in the world.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision, it says that ‘The 2020 Tokyo Olympics will 
take place roughly 150 years after the Meiji Restoration (1868). The first half of this period 
encompassed the 75 years of modernization and militarization, and the second half was the 
75 yeas of recovery, high growth, and maturation of society’ (The Tokyo Cultural Resources 
District Vision official homepage: 6)27. In the second half period of the 75 years, Japan also 
had to develop its cultural diplomacy for promotion of its international presents in order to 
make a better economic and political relationship with the west and the rest of Asia. With the 
increasingly concern for cultural diplomacy, cultural policy gradually became a central issue 
and firmly institutionalized.  Promoting the various culture exchange programmes was 
seen as an effective way to further mutual understanding between Japan and the United 
States and the rest of Asia (especially Korea and China). In the 2000s under the Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, cultural policy was firmly institutionalized along with a new 
initiative, ‘Cool Japan’. The increasing global popularity of Japanese pop culture, such as 
manga, anime and TV games, the so-called soft power, became tightly incorporated into 
nation branding. Cool Japan as part of the Japan Brand Strategy, became carefully 
embedded into the broader political message and diplomatic rhetoric which attempts not 
only to improve Japan’s image toward external nations, but also to reinforce the sense of 
                                                   
27 http://tohbun.jp/wp-content/uploads/Homepage-Tokyo-Cultural-Resources-District-Vision.pdf (Accessed 
24 Sep 2016). 
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national belongings and patriotic pride for Japanese people. 
 
Although there is no clear evidence that can be marshalled to assure Japan’s nation brand 
strategy worked to create a new image of Japan and reinforce the sense of national identity, 
there is some evidence which indicates that the 2020 Tokyo Olympics campaigns seem to 
have stimulated Japanese people’s awareness of ‘Japan in the world’ and of being 
Japanese. In this light, Tokyo as a creative city is now expected to play a vital role in 
promoting Japan’s nation branding with a new image of contemporary Japan.  In 2014, 
launch of the Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance drew on people who not only came from 
the government, but also universities, private research organizations, and companies. 
These groups were involved in taking the initiative to revitalize the regional cultural assets, 
which have survived and enhance Japanese cultural distinctiveness over the radical 
urbanization, which had been taking place since the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The areas of 
Ueno, Hongo, Yanesen, Yushima, Jimbocho and Akihabara, combine as centres of cultural 
capital with the cultural differences and values; they used to be connected in the past, but 
are now disconnected. The Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance seeks to re-connect these 
areas to create a walkable and accessible concentrated cultural capital zone, which can 
empower and increase the attractiveness not only of the local communities, but also of 
Tokyo as a whole.28  
 
Today it is hard to see the inter-connectivities between regional/local cultures which once 
were more interwoven. Yet, in the past, there exist a walking route from Hongo to Ueno, 
Yanaka, Yushima, Akihabara and Jimpocho. There was a daily walking route for Mori Ogai 
who is one of the most famous novelist in the Meiji and Taisho periods. He walked around 
nearly the entire areas of the Central Tokyo North where resides the academic, literary and 
spiritual legacies of Edo culture. (Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision Report 2016:14).  
This suggests that there might be invisible paths, which could be possibly be made visible 
again. The district has a notable concentration of traditional buildings from the feudal era 
and Meiji period. Some of them are registered as cultural heritage properties. Part of the 
planned cultural programme of the Tokyo Cultural Resources Alliance is to preserve them to 
re-activate and re-use for cultural practices in communities (Tokyo Cultural Resources 
District Vision Report 2016: 29).  The preference for conservation of local vernacular styles 
through the reactivate of traditional buildings also helps to create new urban designscapes.  
                                                   
28 This process can also create new channels for flows of information, knowledge and experiences in 
Tokyo. In the past, cities were often seen in terms of an organic metaphors (See Tamari 200) and many 
have argued that ‘[h]istorically the city grew organically’ (Landry 2000:58). The city has never developed in 
a linear way, but is continuously changing and transforming to adjust to ever-changing environments. 
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These buildings provide distinctive aesthetics to reinforce local identities and attract both 
cultural consumers and producers. A good example is the contemporary art gallery, SCAI 
Bathhouse in Yanaka, which was an old public bath in the past. All these process are a 
meaning-making involving the re-discovery traditional local stories and creation new cultural 
narratives through offering new urban experiences.  
 
These practices are often carried out by cultural specialists. They are able to extract new 
values from existing information, knowledge and experiences along with new ways of 
interpretations and meanings. Cultural specialists are usually people who work in creative 
occupations, such as artists, cultural practitioners and cultural entrepreneurs. This links to 
the debate on the two sides of their socio-cultural influence. On the one hand, ’artists and 
cultural producers, often called the ‘creative class’ (Florida 2002), are seen as triggering 
gentrification processes, since their presence attracts affluent consumers and dwellers who 
are supposed to share aesthetic value and lifestyle with the creative class (see Gainza 
2016: 2). The subsequent environmental changes can eventually lead to the evacuation of 
the lower class original inhabitants from the communities. On the other hand, they also have 
the capacity to revitalize forgotten cultural capital in communities in order to stimulate 
economic value and improve the habitants’ quality of life. The debate is still oscillating 
between cultural innovation for people and its negative effects in terms of gentrification (see 
Gainza 2016: 2). 
 
Yet, public institutions with their rigid regulations and often highly hierarchically structures, 
tend to fail to fully deal with vital points of city life in terms of the people’s lived everyday 
practices, such as the capacity for old people to walk easily to shops, for children and 
mothers to walk safely to nursery, and for inhabitants to live in a good secure environment.  
Whereas, cultural specialists with more extensive webs across the various local sectors 
could make crucial links between cultural practices and lived experience though working 
with community-based networks through collaborative projects and participatory initiatives.  
Hence, with more self-governing administrative structure, their activities can offer more 
practical and realistic solutions for many problems.  
 
Here, we can see what is the most important component for creative cities is collaboration 
among cultural specialists, local communities, the private sectors, Non-Profit Organizations, 
governmental institutions, and various civic groups.  With this in mind, all the practices of 
the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision should not be univocal, but should endeavour 
to pick up as many voices as possible, and incorporate their various visions and practices. 
24 
This resonates with the Japanese cultural policy scholar, Yasuo Ito’s definition of cultural 
policy. He asserts ‘(Cultural policy) serves to clarify a consensus building system which 
sustains the activities of various cultural entities (the government, local communities, artists, 
art practitioners, corporations and citizens)….It also helps people to share the same 
assumptions [value] in the outcome/product of cultural activities in order to pass them on to 
the next generation’ (Ito 2008  translated by me). Hence, this definition can echo with the 
practices of The Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision, since the Alliance seeks a wider 
open network of business, government, universities and the private sectors, by emphasizing 
the importance of collaborative and participative cultural practices in order to produce a ‘new 
version’ of creative Tokyo.  
 
In the 2000s, Japanese cultural policy had become weighed down heavily than before and 
subjected to the state’s policy by the keyword, ‘creativity’. (see Valaskivi 2013: 495). In the 
Creating a New Japan proposal in 2011 by the Cool Japan Advisory Council, the panel 
suggested ‘Creative Tokyo’ which is the idea of branding Tokyo by combining several areas 
to orchestrate different pieces of pre-existing cultural assets.  In this context, creativity can 
be understood not as a principle to seek for something new, but rather as a strategy to 
extract value from the existing, the original, or tradition, to create new narratives. Thus, the 
Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision can be seen as strong evidence for the potential to 
explore and experiment with ‘creativity’: how to extricate values and meanings from existing 
(traditional) cultural assets; in what way to re-construct cultural practices with and for 
people; how different people’s voices are in play; how these re-discovered cultural assets 
can create a new image and enhanced cultural presence for Tokyo; and how all these 
re-constructive processes can help to promote the Japan brand.  In line with this, it can be 
conceived that some of the oft-cited critical factors for nation branding and cultural policy 
(often characterized by keywords, such as: attractiveness, distinctiveness, and 
competitiveness), could only be realized though interactive, participatory, incorporative and 
self-governing activities with both the public and the private sectors over time.  Hence, the 
challenge of the Tokyo Cultural Resources District Vision continues to open up new 
horizons for future cultural policy. 
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